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Abstract: We examine the contribution to labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector of
investment in different intangible asset categories—computerized information, innovative property,
and economic competencies—for a set of 18 European countries between 1995 and 2017, as well
as whether this contribution varies between different groups of countries. The motivation is to
go a step further and identify which single or combination of intangible assets are relevant. The
main findings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, all the three different categories of intangible
assets contribute to labor productivity growth. In particular, intangible assets related to economic
competences together with innovative property assets have been identified as the main drivers;
specifically, advertising and marketing, organizational capital, research and development (R&D)
investment, and design. Secondly, splitting the sample of European Union (EU) member states into
three groups—northern, central and southern Europe—allows for the identification of a significant
differentiated behavior between and within groups, in terms of the effects of investment in intangible
assets on labor productivity growth. We conclude that measures promoting investment in intangibles
at EU level should be accompanied by specific measures focusing on each country’s needs, for the
purpose of promoting labor productivity growth. The obtained evidence suggests that the solution
for the innovation deficit of some European economies consist not only of raising R&D expenditure,
but also exploiting complementarities between different types of assets.
Keywords: intangible capital; labor productivity; manufacturing
1. Introduction
Since 1995, the rate of labor productivity growth in Europe has been declining through-
out almost the whole considered period, with the exception of two short positive time
spans coinciding with the upswing of the business cycle at the end of the 1990s and around
2006–2007. Finally, during the Great Recession of 2008–2009, the European Union (EU) saw
a decline in labor productivity parallel to the contraction of the economy. Although some
EU members are showing good performance in terms of recovery, others are displaying
difficulties (Corrado et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2018). The crisis that started in 2008 has changed
the perceptions of the role of the manufacturing industry. It brought the benefits of a strong
and stable manufacturing base back to the center of the scene.
As a consequence, many authors have tried to find explanations to the declining
trend of labor productivity growth over the last two decades (Kim et al. 2021; Roth 2020;
McGrattan 2020; Piekkola 2020; Inklaar et al. 2019; Pyka et al. 2019; Park and Choi 2019;
Danileviciene and Lace 2017; Corrado et al. 2005, 2006, 2009, 2017a, 2017b, 2018; Bounfour
and Miyagawa 2015; Van Ark and Jäger 2017; Van Ark 2016; Van Ark and O’Mahony 2016;
Van Ark et al. 2009; Marrano and Haskel 2006; van Rooijen-Horsten et al. 2008; Fukao et al.
2009; Hao et al. 2009; Marrano et al. 2009; Mc Morrow et al. 2010; Edquist 2011; Strobel
2012; Mas and Stehrer 2012; Timmer et al. 2010; Timmer et al. 2011). Their results analyzing
the reasons for the slow labor productivity growth in EU member states suggest that it
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might be explained by the differences in the accumulation of intangible assets that play a
complementary role to information and communication technologies (ICT) capital.
The nature of the impact of the inclusion of intangible capital in the growth accounting
model is similar across the countries for which the estimates are available. It determines an
increase in labor productivity growth and in the contribution of capital deepening, and a
decrease in total factor productivity (TFP) growth (Niebel et al. 2017; Corrado et al. 2018).
But intangible expenditure is currently treated as current expense in the national accounts
rather than as an investment. This determines an understatement of investment in the
economy and an incomplete picture of the main sources of growth.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that several authors have grouped the countries
attaining different criteria, such as geographical, size of the economies considered or the
strengths or weakness of their industry. For example, as said above, Piekkola (2017) defines
country groups as northern, central and southern Europe, while Novotna and Volek (2018)
classify countries as “old” and “new” EU member states. Van Ark and Jäger (2017) group
the countries into large (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom) and small
economies (Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands and Sweden)
and within each group they differentiate those countries that have a strong manufacturing
sector and those that do not. Peiró-Palomino (2016) analyses convergence in intangible
investment by region, and groups the countries considered into Mediterranean, eastern
and central Europe. Furthermore, Corrado et al. (2013) classify the sample into Scandina-
vian (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), Anglo-Saxon (Ireland, United Kingdom), continental
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, The Netherlands) and Mediterranean
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), and Pianta (2013) differentiates countries between “center”
and “periphery”, in terms of whether they have a strong industry or not.
The aim of this research is to explore the contribution to labor productivity growth
of investment in different single intangible asset categories—computerized information,
innovative property, and economic competencies—in manufacturing industry for a set of
18 European countries (Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Italy, The Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, and United Kingdom) between 1995 and 2017. In the context of the knowledge
economy, and with the aim of going a step further against this background, it is interesting
to investigate the role of intangible investment attaining the country-specific characteristics.
Thus, by grouping our sample of countries into northern, central and southern Europe
following Piekkola (2017), we want to explore to what extent investment in intangible
assets on labor productivity growth depends on country-specific characteristics, confirming
the existence of heterogeneous effects between and within them.
The results should help us to identify which single or combination of intangible asset
types are the main drivers of labor productivity growth, in order to define and establish
adequate common, as well as country-specific, industrial policy measures to promote a
better economic performance.
The main contribution of our analysis is not to demonstrate if investment in intangibles
contributes to labor productivity growth and which type is a major driver, as McGrattan
(2020); Piekkola (2020); Roth (2020); Park and Choi (2019); Muntean (2014); Roth and
Thum (2013); Ilmakunnas and Piekkola (2014); and Corrado et al. (2014b, 2017a, 2017b,
2018), among others, have already shown, but, in contrast to other analyses (Roth 2020;
Corrado et al. 2018; Niebel et al. 2017), we want to go a step further and identify which
of them might be complementary, as well as to find out whether there are heterogeneous
effects between the chosen groups of countries. Considering the potential differences of the
impact of intangible investment between the considered countries, it may help to define
strategies focusing on the specific characteristics and needs to improve labor productivity
performance for industry in our sample of countries. In contrast to many other studies
(Dal Borgo et al. 2013; Edquist 2011; Hao et al. 2009) that examine the business or the
market sector, we focus our analysis on manufacturing industry instead of a broader
set of economic sectors, as it is considered a key driver of labor productivity growth
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(Coad and Vezzani 2017; European Commission 2009, 2012, 2013a). The fact that some EU
countries with a large and stable manufacturing base have better overcome the crisis and
also recovered earlier has redeemed the reputation of the manufacturing industry. To have
a dynamic manufacturing sector is considered again a prerequisite for an innovative and
fast-growing economy (Aiginger and Rodrik 2020).
All this explains the resurgence and renewed interest in industrial policy and in how to
design and implement targeted, but also homogeneous policy measures (Coad and Vezzani
2017; European Commission 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Dhéret 2014; Pianta 2013; O’Sullivan et al.
2013). Having barely recovered from the last crisis of 2007–2008, the economy is facing a
new crisis caused by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. EU industries are suffering
this harmful thread, as many have had to shut down or reduce their production as well as
reduce their labor force, while being under severe financial pressure. They have to find
new ways to survive within a new background due to restrictive measures.
In recent years, investment has shifted from tangible to intangible capital, but depend-
ing on the countries, the contribution of intangible investment to labor productivity growth
clearly differs from that of tangibles (Roth 2020; Corrado et al. 2017a, 2018; Niebel et al. 2017;
Falk 2013). Therefore, different intangible investment strategies might lead to differentiated
contributions to labor productivity growth, which results in some countries displaying a
better performance than others. This fact explains the interest in grouping our sample of
countries.
Taking all this into account, the hypotheses that we consider in this research are the
following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Investment in intangible assets contributes to the growth of labor productivity
in manufacturing in European economies.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). Computerized information, innovative property and economic competences
make a different contribution to the growth of labor productivity in manufacturing.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b). The combination of different typologies of intangible assets accelerates the
rate of growth of labor productivity in manufacturing.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The influence of intangible assets investment on labor productivity in manu-
facturing depends on country-specific characteristics.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). The contribution of R&D investment to explain differences in labor
productivity growth is higher among northern European economies.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). The contribution of intangible assets investment to explain differences in
labor productivity growth is negligible in central European economies.
Hypothesis 2c (H2c). The contribution of intangible assets investment to explain differences in
labor productivity growth is higher among southern European economies.
The investigation also aims to identify which of the different intangible assets are
the most decisive in triggering a higher labor productivity in European manufacturing.
Consequently, it aims to provide some orientations for industrial policy. The research
is focused on a wide and unexplored time period, and it takes into account the distinct
influence of intangible assets according to the different sources of knowledge and the
geographical grouping of countries. These are the main contributions of our research to the
previous literature.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes some of
the literature background on intangibles and productivity growth. Section 3 presents a
description of the data and methodology. Section 4 shows the results, Section 5 discusses
and, finally, Section 6 concludes, indicating the main implications.
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2. Background Literature
There is an extensive literature on intangible investments, addressing issues such as
their measurement, the convenience of capitalizing on and including them in the national
accounting system, as well as their contribution to labor productivity growth (Kim et al.
2021; Roth 2020; Kaus et al. 2020; Bisztray et al. 2020; Piekkola 2017; Corrado et al. 2005,
2017a, 2018; Niebel et al. 2017; Marrano et al. 2009; Chun et al. 2012; Goodridge et al.
2013; Baldwin et al. 2012; Miyagawa and Hisa 2013). As Roth (2020) says, analysis in this
field has been undertaken focusing on different aspects, such as individual or groups of
countries, industry, firms, on complementary investments, among others.
Research on this issue undertaken by Corrado et al. (2005, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2017a,
2018) marks the beginning of a number of studies measuring intangible investment and
showing the relevance of intangible capital for labor productivity growth. Departing from
Nakamura’s (1999, 2001) analysis, they developed expenditure-based measures of a large
range on intangibles for the United States (US). The contribution of labor composition and
physical, or tangible, capital deepening to labor productivity has been well researched.
In contrast, until recently, intangible assets were not considered as contributors to labor
productivity growth. Similar studies have been conducted in Canada, (Muntean 2014),
Japan (Fukao et al. 2009), Australia (Barnes and McClure 2009) and Europe (Corrado et al.
2013; Goodridge et al. 2013; Roth and Thum 2013; Jona Lasinio et al. 2011; Jalava et al.
2007).
Until recently, spending on intangible assets was counted as an intermediate expense
in the systems of national accounts, rather than as investment in intangible capital.
Corrado et al. (2009) indicate that specific features of some intangible assets, such as
non-rivalry and the lack of verifiability, visibility and appropriability of returns, explain
the fact that the majority of intangible assets are disqualified as capital. These authors,
however, argue that these distinct features do not make intangible assets an intermediate
good (Muntean 2014).
Corrado et al. (2006) argue that the reason for treating intangibles as capital is that any
use of resources that reduces current consumption in order to increase it in the future can
be considered as an investment. It has not been so long since computer software started
to be treated as capital in the national accounts of many countries, whereas many other
intangibles, for example research and development (R&D), are currently not. Intangible
assets are generally defined as assets that provide future benefits, but do not have a physical
embodiment, such as software, R&D, market, and consumer research.
Despite their uniqueness, intangible assets share basic common characteristics with
physical capital. As with any other type of capital, intangibles are used in the production
of goods and services and provide future benefits. As with investment in physical capital,
investment in intangible assets represents foregone current consumption for the benefit of
greater future consumption.
Thus, intangible assets should be classified as capital and spending on intangibles
should be counted as investment rather than operational or intermediate expenses. Other-
wise, the aggregate level of output would remain underestimated. This potentially creates
distortions in business investment and resource allocation. In addition, effectiveness of
public policy may also be adversely affected if investment and capital in the economy are
measured imprecisely. These distortions could ultimately lead to a decline in productivity
and economic growth.
As Jona Lasinio et al. (2011) state, there is a large number of studies on intangible
investment and its appropriate measurement and contribution to labor productivity growth.
The problem is that most of them focus only on some assets (R&D capital, for example),
leaving out other elements such as organizational capital or brand equity. But some
authors, such as Sichel (2008), have gone a step further in implementing new approaches
to measuring intangibles as financial market valuation, direct expenditure data and other
performance measures.
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Taking into account a possible revision of the national accounting framework, Cor-
rado et al. (2005) proposed a broader definition for innovation in order to examine its
impact on labor productivity growth. For this purpose, they grouped the various items
that constitute the knowledge of the firm into three basic categories: (i) computerized
information, (ii) innovative property and (iii) economic competencies.
Computerized information includes knowledge which is embedded in computer
programs and computerized databases. Innovative property includes the scientific knowl-
edge embedded in patents, licenses, and general know-how, as well as “the innovative
and artistic content in commercial copyrights, licenses and designs” (Corrado et al. 2005,
pp. 23–26).
The economic competencies category is defined as “the value of brand names and
other knowledge embedded in firm-specific human and structural resources” (Corrado et al.
2005, p. 28). It includes expenditures on advertising, market research, firm-specific human
capital, and organizational capital. These measures try to capture a range of knowledge
assets that firms invest in to run their business, which are key to encouraging labor produc-
tivity growth. Examples of those are an increase in the selling potential of a product, the
development of processes and a productive environment for the actual physical production
of a good.
Brynjolfsson et al. (2002, 2017) showed the positive relationship between computerized
information, here in particular via an interaction effect with organizational capital, on labor
productivity growth. Other authors such as Lichtenberg (1993); Coe and Helpman (1995);
Park (1995); and Guellec and Potterie (2001) did the same with certain dimensions of
innovative property (scientific R&D), demonstrating its contribution to labor productivity
growth.
The single dimensions of economic competencies, namely brand names, firm-specific
human capital, and organizational capital are also relevant in stimulating labor productivity
growth.
Following Roth and Thum (2013), brand names should positively affect labor produc-
tivity growth since an important aspect of today’s products is the “image” attached to them.
The ownership of a brand that is appealing to customers permits a seller to acquire a higher
margin for goods or services that are similar to those offered by competitors. Expenditure
on market research comprises, next to expenditure on advertising, an important part of the
investment in brand equity (Cañibano et al. 2000).
Another important asset of a firm is firm-specific human capital. Cañibano et al.
(2000) stress that a firm with more competent employees is likely to acquire higher profits
than competitors whose workers are less skilled. In this regard, Abowd et al. (2005) argue
that the value of companies will increase if the quality of their human resources increases.
Organizational capital of a firm is another relevant dimension of economic competen-
cies. In an era where goods become more and more sophisticated and production processes
are becoming more complex, the management of the production process that involve highly
technological physical capital is a key factor for the firm. Organizational capital is defined
by Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005, p. 75) as “an agglomeration of technologies—business
practices, processes and designs and incentive and compensation systems—that together
enable some firms to consistently and efficiently extract from a given level of physical and
human resources a higher value of product than other firms find possible to attain”. They
(Lev and Radhakrishnan 2003, 2005) considered it the only competitive asset truly owned
by a firm, while the others are tradable and thus available for every firm that wants to
invest in them.
There is a vast amount of literature showing and examining it for the different types
of intangibles and from different points of view. Belhocine (2009) finds that in Canada, if
spending on intangible assets is not included in aggregate investment, real gross domestic
product (GDP) growth is, on average, underestimated by 0.1 percentage points per year
from 1999 to 2001. It is underestimated by about 0.25 percentage points for 2004 (Muntean
2014, p. 23).
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Corrado et al. (2009) indicate that in the US, if investment in intangibles is not included,
GDP growth is underestimated by about 0.25 percentage points per year from 1995 to 2002.
Further studies on the contribution of intangibles to labor productivity growth, such as
the one undertaken by Van Ark et al. (2009) focusing on the market sector in the US and
selected European countries for the 1995–2006, show that intangible capital deepening
contributed on average 0.83 percentage points in the US and 0.72 percentage points in the
larger European countries (Muntean 2014, p. 23). Dal Borgo et al. (2013) showed that, for
the period from 2000 to 2008, intangible capital deepening accounted for 23% of growth in
market sector value added in the United Kingdom, a larger contribution than computer
hardware (12%).
Ilmakunnas and Piekkola (2014) demonstrate that investment in organizational capital
has a positive influence on labor productivity growth. The results obtained by Yallwe and
Buscemi (2014), who discuss the contributions of intellectual assets to labor productivity
growth, are also positive.
Data obtained by Corrado et al. (2018, pp. 15–22; 2013, p. 278) show that the rate
of tangible investment in the EU15 declined sharply from 2007 to 2009, while the rate of
intangible investment remained about flat. In the US, intangible investment fell. Across
Europe, there are small differences by region, and intangible investment relative to tangibles
held up better in recent years on both continents. Overall, the shift to intangible investment
from 1995 to 2009 is a striking trend.
In this context, there are still many issues that have not been tackled yet in the
literature. The present research contributes to advances in this topic by considering how
the single categories of intangible investment influence labor productivity growth in
the manufacturing industry, and which combinations are more appropriate than others.
Furthermore, we want to find out whether there are heterogeneous effects of investment in
intangible assets on labor productivity growth in the different considered EU countries, as
well as what the implications in terms of industrial policy. To our knowledge, such kind of
analysis has not been implemented for the manufacturing industry using data covering the
Great Recession.
3. Data and Methods
3.1. Data
To carry out this study we use the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts,
2019 release (EU KLEMS 2019) (henceforth EUKLEMS)1, which contain internationally
comparable data for output and inputs, as well as for investment in intangible assets. This
database includes a wide range of measures on output growth, employment, skill creation,
capital formation and multi-factor productivity at the industrial level for EU member states
from 1970 until 2018, and from 1995 to 2017 for data on investment in intangible assets.
Labor productivity measures are based on own elaboration and are defined in terms
of hours worked, as well as all the variables needed for the analysis, where appropriate.
As Timmer et al. (2007a, 2007b) state, the main advantage of EU KLEMS database
is that it allows its users to go beyond the aggregate level of economy to analyze the
productivity performance of individual industries and their contribution to aggregate
growth.
For more information on the source and details for measurement of intangible assets,
see Corrado et al. (2014a, 2014b). Corrado et al. (2006) distinguish three classes of intangible
assets:
• Computerized information: software and databases.
• Innovative property (scientific and non-scientific): R&D, design (including archi-
tectural and engineering design), product development in the financial industry,
exploration of minerals and production of artistic originals.
• Economic competencies: firm investment in reputation, human and organizational
capital.
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Concerning investment in intangibles, we include all the variables belonging to these
three classes of assets for which data are available for the considered period.
The data used in this research cover the period from 1995 to 2017 for a set of 18 EU
member states (Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Italy, The Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swe-
den, and United Kingdom). The criteria used to decide the time period as well as the
countries chosen for this analysis rely on the availability of data. Thus, we have im-
plemented in our study the latest data release available, so that a broad time span and
geographical coverage of the EU is provided as we cover members of northern, central and
southern Europe.
The criteria used to group countries into three groups is based in previous literature on
the contribution of intangibles as generators of growth in Europe. In particular, we follow
the classification by Piekkola (2017) who classifies European countries into three groups: (i)
northern Europe (the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), the Baltic
countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), The Netherlands, and the UK); (ii) central Europe
(Austria, Belgium, Czechia, France, Germany, and Slovakia); and (iii) southern Europe
(Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain). We also considered Luxembourg, a
country that has been classified as part of central Europe.
Table A1 (see Appendix A) displays the list of variables considered in the present
analysis as well as information of variable definition and data sources. Table A2 (see
Appendix A) also provides some descriptive statistics of the dataset used for the whole
considered period. Concretely, this shows the average annual rate of change of the variables
that intervene in our empirical analysis.
3.2. Methods
In order to estimate the contribution of investment in intangible assets to labor produc-
tivity, a log-linear Cobb–Douglas production function was used as the starting point. As in
Roth and Thum (2013), a reduced form equation, in which the independent variable is the
growth rate of investment in intangible assets and the dependent variable is labor produc-
tivity growth, can be easily derived from this theoretical model. The analysis is undertaken
in growth rates and all variables are expressed in terms of logarithmic differences.
In particular, the change in the log of labor productivity of manufacturing in country
i between time t and t − 1 (LPit − LPit−1) is explained by the change of the different of
intangible assets between time t and t − 1, (Xt − Xt−1). The model is enlarged with country
fixed effects (Ci) that will account for potential unobserved heterogeneity and also with
period effects (Yt) accounting for common shocks in the considered countries, while Uit is
a random error term.
LPit − LPit−1 = β0 + β1(Xt − Xt−1) + Ci + Yt + Uit (1)
The analysis is carried out on a sample of 18 countries for a period covering 23 years,
conforming an unbalanced panel. So, the total number of observations would be 414, but
as far as there are a few missing values, the real number of observations varies across
estimated models between 389 and 408. When the analysis is performed by groups of
countries, the number of observations is as follows: northern Europe, between 170 and 178
observations (8 countries × 23 years = 184 observations); central Europe, between 133 and
138 (6 countries × 23 years = 138 observations); and southern Europe, between 88 and 92
(4 countries × 23 years = 92 observations). Table A1 (see Appendix A) displays the variables
used in the present analysis.
The analysis is implemented in two steps. In both, we proceed in the same way; in the
first phase, we start the analysis by introducing one by one the single intangible asset types
belonging to each of the above defined classes of intangible assets, in order to find out if they
are significant or not and to what extent they are contributors to labor productivity growth.
In the second phase, we combine the significant independent variables and introduce them
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in the equation in order to find out how well or not they work together in increasing labor
productivity.
In our analysis, we apply the same methodology for the whole sample of countries
and each for the northern, central and southern group of countries. This grouping of
countries has been decided by attending to a geographical criterion following Piekkola’s
(2017) analysis. Each column in Tables 1–4 presents a regression model including one type
of asset and in the last columns, combinations of different type of assets that have been
identified as relevant in the previous analysis.
4. Results
According to our data, real investment in intangible assets per hour worked grew
at an annual average rate of 3.3 percent from 1995 to 2017 (see Table A2 in Appendix A).
Software, although belonging to computerized information, one of the smallest categories
of intangibles, was the fastest growing category in the period. It grew at an average annual
rate of 14.6 percent, followed by scientific R&D (from now on R&D) with an average
annual growth rate of 4.9 percent. Design (New architectural and engineering designs, new
product development costs in the financial industry, entertainment, artistic and literary
originals, and mineral exploration) grew at a slightly lower rate (4.5 percent).
In terms of investment per hour worked for the sample of countries considered in
this study, these figures indicate that computerized information and innovative property
represent a major part of investment in intangible assets. Thus, one may think that they are
also major contributors to labor productivity growth in the 1995–2017 period. However,
our findings do not provide support for this.
Table 1 reports the estimation results for all countries between 1995 and 2017. The
analysis starts by estimating the contribution of both investment in intangible and tangible
assets to labor productivity growth. The table also includes information about the influence
of each single intangible asset type on the evolution of labor productivity. Finally, the
significant independent variables are combined to test complementary effects.
The addition of all kinds of intangible assets seems not to contribute significantly to
labor productivity growth in contrast to tangible capital, which turned out to be highly
significant in our model.
However, the disaggregation of investment into different intangible assets provides a
highly valuable contribution. It reveals that some sources of knowledge exert a positive
influence on labor productivity. Similarly, to other previous studies, such as Roth (2020);
Corrado et al. (2018); Hao et al. (2009); Roth and Thum (2013) or Corrado et al. (2014a), the
investment in intangible assets improves labor productivity in manufacturing. Hypothesis
H1 is confirmed.
When introducing the variables one by one in order to identify those intangible
assets that are significant for labor productivity growth, we find out an unexpected result,
which is that investment in software has no significant influence. The lacking influence of
computerized information contrasts with the results obtained by other authors such as
Corrado et al. (2013); Chun et al. (2012); and Van Ark and Jäger (2017), where ICT not only
shows up a positive relation between labor productivity growth, but is complementary.
One possible explanation may be that a minimum level of investment in software has been
already achieved, so that additional investment is not significant. Brynjolfsson et al. (2002)
confirm that what matters is the use, not the endowment. Once everyone is provided with
the software, then the difference lies strictly in its strategic use.
Another unexpected result is the reduced influence of the single intangible components
belonging to the innovative property category. Investment in R&D is significant, but shows
a moderate influence in promoting labor productivity growth (0.187 percentage points
and is statistically significant at a 5% level). In addition, the contribution of the other
asset type (design), is not statistically significant. Consequently, innovative property
assets are revealed as moderate contributors to labor productivity growth in European
manufacturing.
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Table 1. Estimation results for all countries, 1995–2017.
TC 0.235 *** - - - - - - - 0.206 ** 0.0879 **
(0.0636) - - - - - - - (0.0757) (0.0754)
lC - 0.199 - - - - - - - -
- (0.140) - - - - - - - -
SW - - 0.0594 ** - - - - - - -
- - (0.0866) - - - - - - -
R&D - - - 0.187 * - - - - - 0.213 **
- - - (0.0907) - - - - - (0.0857)
DESIGN - - - - 0.155 - - - - -
- - - - (0.117) - - - - -
ADV - - - - - 0.0125 - - - -
- - - - - (0.125) - - - -
TRAIN - - - - - - 0.139 ** - - 0.00441**
- - - - - - (0.0585) - - (0.0861)
ORGCAP - - - - - - - 0.203 * - 0.188 *
- - - - - - - (0.113) - (0.103)
N 396 396 396 396 408 408 408 408 396 389
R2 0.777 0.761 0.752 0.769 0.767 0.747 0.762 0.768 0.786 0.824
Source: Own elaboration based on EU KLEMS, 2019 release (https://euklems.eu/; accessed on 29 March 2021). See Stehrer et al. (2019) for
more details. Notes: Unbalanced panel, period 1995–2017, 18 countries (Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). All specifications
include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Turning now to the third category of intangible assets, economic competences, the
organizational capital is by far the most significant variable among all the other considered
in this study, jointly with vocational training. The contribution of organizational capital
(0.203 points) exceeds the positive effect of R&D investment on labor productivity. All
three described asset types that make up economic competences display a distinctive result,
together with an adjusted R-square value between 0.76 and 0.78, which is an acceptable fit.
Accordingly, these findings supply a positive verification of hypothesis H1a: Computerized
information, innovative property and economic competences make a different contribution
to the growth of labor productivity in manufacturing.
We also combine the significant independent variables and introduce them into the
equation in order to find out whether they are complementary and how well they work
together in increasing labor productivity. We start by combining the different significant
assets with other assets belonging to their category, and afterwards with others belonging
to the other intangible asset categories. When trying to assess the combined influence of
more than one variable, a positive influence is detected from the interaction between R&D
investment and organizational capital on labor productivity growth, accordingly to the
results obtained by Brynjolfsson et al. (2002). The combination of innovative property
assets and economic competences clearly accelerates labor productivity, contributing to a
growth rate of 0.40 percentage points. Adjusted R-square value increases to 0.82 percentage
points, which is a good fitting. H1b is fully corroborated. Here too, this result contrasts
with the above-mentioned studies (Corrado et al. 2013, 2017a; Chun et al. 2012; Van Ark
and Jäger 2017; Niebel et al. 2017).
Here again we reproduce the analysis previously undertaken on three different groups
of countries: northern, central and southern European economies. The aim is to analyze
whether different intangible investment strategies lead to a differentiated labor productivity
growth and, thus, to a differentiated ability in generating gross value added. This would
shed some light on why some countries display a better performance in labor productivity
growth than others. We expect the latter to allow us to discriminate when defining and
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implementing policy measures to improve the performance of productivity. Ultimately, it
would permit the design of concrete and targeted industrial policy measures, particularly
for the countries lagging behind the ones showing a better performance.
Results are shown in Tables 2–4. The goodness of fit test reveals high values, ranging
from 0.65 to 0.95 and the contribution of intangible assets is clearly different among the
defined groups, confirming hypothesis H2. Different groups of countries follow different
strategies to accumulate intangible assets, with a distinctive influence on the evolution of
productivity in manufacturing. Results depend on country-specific characteristics. One
possible explanation may be the specific characteristics of the manufacturing industry of
the countries included in each group, as if in the considered period investment in this
kind of intangible assets is relevant, because the needs are different, and they already have
invested enough in the other asset types.
Considering the estimation results for northern European economies (Table 2), again
here investment in intangibles is revealed as a driver for productivity growth, even stronger
than the investment in tangible assets (0.31 percentage points compared to 0.18). For
these economies, the investment in the different sources of knowledge encourages labor
productivity. Considering the variables individually, the results show that computerized
information, innovative property, and economic competences exert a positive influence.
In particular, R&D investment, followed by advertising and marketing and also software,
is a major contributor to labor productivity growth. Vocational training is significant too,
but at a significance level of 10%. All the other variables considered, either individually
or combined with others, are rejected because of the lack of statistical significance. These
economies also get the most from the combination of the investment in both tangible and
intangible assets, and also from the combination of different types of intangible assets. The
investment in R&D, together with computer software, provides the most favorable scenario
for productivity growth (joint contribution of 0.28 percentage points). As this is the unique
group of economies with a positive and significant influence of scientific R&D on labor
productivity growth, hypothesis H2a is also verified. Northern European manufacturing
shows the highest level of investment in this intangible asset, making the difference and
providing a positive influence on labor productivity performance (Van Ark et al. 2009).
Examining the estimation results for central European countries (Table 3), a very
different situation is detected. The growth in labor productivity during the 1995–2017
period is essentially the consequence of the heavy investment in tangible assets. The
contribution of physical capital is exorbitant (0.49 percentage points, with a significance
of 1%) whereas the investment in tangible assets turns out not be significant. None of
intangible assets become significant for the emergence of productivity growth. The high
growth rate in capital investment of some eastern European economies would limit or
make unnecessary the potential benefits from the investment in intangible assets, including
scientific R&D. Complementarity effects are not detected between both types of investment.
Consequently, hypothesis H2b is fully verified, although the adjusted R-square values here
are somewhat lower (between 0.65 and 0.78).
The most outstanding outcomes from intangible assets investment are provided
by southern Europe economies (Table 4). This kind of investment clearly explains the
differences in labor productivity growth among the economies included in this group.
Tangible and intangible assets contribute to the improvement of labor productivity with a
similar strength (0.43 and 0.44 percentage points, respectively). However, complementary
effects between both types of investment are not detected in our model.
Increasing investment in advertising and marketing, design, organizational capital, or
software contributes the most to labor productivity growth in southern Europe. A combi-
nation of investment in computerized information and innovative property provides the
most major effect on the evolution of labor productivity (joint influence of 0.58 percentage
points). However, a combination of other intangible assets does not provide significant
results, probably due to the high level of correlation between these investments. Here,
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some combinations of variables in an equation works out well together, but only when two
variables are included; for more than two variables the equation is rejected.
Table 2. Estimation results for northern Europe.
TC 0.183 ** - - - - - - - 0.135 * −0.0714
(0.0744) - - - - - - - (0.0643) (0.0546)
IC - 0.307 ** - - - - - - 0.253 * -
- (0.119) - - - - - - (0.116) -
SW - - 0.155 *** - - - - - - 0.0639 **
- - (0.0440) - - - - - - (0.0190)
R&D - - - 0.223 *** - - - - - 0.220 ***
- - - (0.0509) - - - - - (0.0557)
DESIGN - - - - 0.0497 * - - - - -
- - - - (0.110) - - - - -
ADV - - - - - 0.219 * - - - −0.00375
- - - - - (0.110) - - - (0.0382)
TRAIN - - - - - - 0.142 * - - −0.00763
- - - - - - (0.0698) - - (0.0616)
ORGCAP - - - - - - - 0.212 - -
- - - - - - - (0.126) - -
N 175 175 175 170 178 178 178 178 175 170
R2 0.886 0.894 0.910 0.936 0.867 0.877 0.875 0.885 0.906 0.945
Source: Own elaboration based on EU KLEMS, 2019 release (https://euklems.eu/; accessed on 29 March 2021). See Stehrer et al. (2019) for
more details. Notes: Unbalanced panel, period 1995–2017, 8 countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands,
Sweden, United Kingdom). All specifications include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster Robust Standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3. Estimation results for central Europe.
TC 0.491 ** - - - - - - - 0.416 ** 0.356 **
(0.126) - - - - - - - (0.106) (0.112)
IC - −0.355 - - - - - - −0.225 -
- (0.244) - - - - - - (0.206) -
SW - - −0.190** - - - - - - -
- - (0.0596) - - - - - - -
R&D - - - 0.328 - - - - - -
- - - (0.261) - - - - - -
DESIGN - - - - 0.238 - - - - -
- - - - (0.359) - - - - -
ADV - - - - - −0.231** - - - −0.0531
- - - - - (0.0805) - - - (0.0651)
TRAIN - - - - - - 0.644 - - -
- - - - - - (0.438) - - -
ORGCAP - - - - - - - −0.164 - -
- - - - - - - (0.186) - -
N 133 133 133 136 138 138 138 138 133 133
R2 0.698 0.666 0.725 0.689 0.665 0.686 0.678 0.647 0.713 0.775
Source: Own elaboration based on EU KLEMS, 2019 release (https://euklems.eu/; accessed on 29 March 2021). See Stehrer et al. (2019) for
more details. Notes: Unbalanced panel, period 1995–2017, 6 countries (Austria, Czechia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic).
All specifications include country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 4. Estimation results for southern Europe.
TC 0.425 *** - - - - - - - 0.153 * -
(0.0478) - - - - - - - (0.0915) -
IC - 0.437 *** - - - - - - 0.356 ** -
- (0.0621) - - - - - - (0.0874) -
SW - - 0.247 *** - - - - - - 0.144 *
- - (0.0419) - - - - - - (0.0610)
R&D - - - −0.462 * - - - - - -
- - - (0.171) - - - - - -
DESIGN - - - - 0.412 *** - - - - −0.0887
- - - - (0.0659) - - - - (0.0379)
ADV - - - - - 0.542 *** - - - 0.431 **
- - - - - (0.0549) - - - (0.122)
TRAIN - - - - - - 0.152 - - -
- - - - - - (0.155) - - -
ORGCAP - - - - - - - 0.396 *** - -
- - - - - - - (0.0484) - -
N 88 88 88 90 92 92 92 92 88 88
R2 0.850 0.912 0.909 0.813 0.900 0.922 0.800 0.916 0.921 0.943
Source: Own elaboration based on EU KLEMS, 2019 release https://euklems.eu/; accessed on 29 March 2021). See Stehrer et al. (2019) for
more details. Notes: Unbalanced panel, period 1995–2017, 4 countries (Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Spain). All specifications include country
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Southern European economies, including Romania and Slovenia, are highly dependent
on intangible investment to accelerate labor performance, confirming hypothesis H2c. The
individual and joint contribution of intangible assets to the growth of productivity in
manufacturing is higher among this group of countries. Only the investment in R&D
provides an unexpected result, with a negative contribution, revealing that this type of
investment does not promote the acceleration and convergence of productivity levels in
these economies.
5. Discussion
Some findings have emerged according to the posed hypotheses and research ques-
tions. Empirical analysis reveals that all single intangible assets are significant contributors
to labor productivity growth in these countries in the considered period. However, a simple
splitting of countries intro three geographical blocks is enough to identify a significant
differentiated behavior between groups. Heterogeneous effects of investment in intangibles
on labor productivity growth have been clearly verified.
In addition, inside each group, intangible investment figures also display a differenti-
ated evolution (Table A2 in Appendix A), supporting the fact that differences in intangible
assets may explain not only heterogeneity among the groups, but also inside them. In
fact, higher investment rates in intangible assets do not necessarily imply that those assets
become major drivers of labor productivity growth. Thus, our results reflect the different
needs in terms of investment in intangibles aimed at promoting labor productivity growth
of the countries pertaining to each block.
Concerning the different classes of intangible assets, for a long time, R&D activities and
innovative property have been traditionally viewed as the main drivers of innovation. The
Lisbon Strategy, the Horizon 2020 Strategy, and the European Round Table of Industrialists
(2017) point out the importance of R&D and innovation explicitly. Consequently, they
have been disproportionately encouraged by governments over of other intangible assets
that are increasingly revealed as equally or more relevant than R&D to labor productivity
growth. As Muntean (2014) states, governments around the world provide significant
support for innovative activities in the manufacturing industry.
Economies 2021, 9, 82 13 of 21
Our findings support the positive influence of R&D investment on the evolution of
labor productivity. However, similarly to Roth and Thum (2013), our results also show
that innovative property is not necessarily the main driver of labor productivity growth, as
expected from the guidelines of the Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission 2010),
but rather, economic competencies. One of the main criticisms of measuring innovation
through investment in R&D is that it does not seem to be a valid indicator for a country’s
innovativeness. It is certainly an appropriate indicator in countries with a strong manufac-
turing industry (northern Europe), but not in those countries with a high specialization in
service activities, in which design activities are revealed to be becoming more decisive in
improving productivity (southern Europe).
Previous studies examining the contribution of the different categories of intangibles
to labor productivity growth had shown their significance, suggesting that focusing solely
on R&D might not provide a complete view of innovation. Bauer et al. (2020, pp. 14–15)
and Roth (2020) summarize a wide range of studies on the impact of capital investment
in intangible assets on labor productivity growth. As the Horizon 2020 Strategy and the
European Commission (2013b) recognize, intangible capital is the major determinant of
innovation followed by R&D, which has been revealed to be no longer such an important
driver of innovation as initially considered. Thus, it is important to precisely target the
different innovation measures in the Horizon 2020 Strategy in order to obtain the best
results when it comes to foster innovation in the EU.
In particular, our findings reveal that more importance should be placed on the
intangible assets included in the economic competencies category. This raises the question
on how to invest strategically in those intangible assets that are major contributors to labor
productivity growth. As Muntean (2014) states, empirical studies of intangible capital
(Van Ark et al. 2009; Jona Lasinio et al. 2011; Roth and Thum 2011, 2013) indicate that
other categories of intangibles, such as vocational training, advertising and marketing
(brand equity) and organizational capital also contribute significantly to labor productivity
growth. Our results confirm these previous findings, particularly for southern European
economies.
Concerning vocational training, skills feature as a major policy element in the Europe
2020 agenda. The European Commission (2010) implemented an overall strategy for
improving education and training systems via anticipation and investment in human
capital supported by EU financial instruments, tools to monitor skills and training needs
and trends, and specific initiatives to bring together the relevant actors. There are significant
differences in the skills, the achievements and the effectiveness of vocational training
systems across member states. The contribution of apprenticeships in supporting industrial
competitiveness is widely recognized. Large differences in the skills, the achievements and
the effectiveness of vocational training systems across member states correlate with acute
unemployment in crisis-hit member states. To invest in this intangible asset will positively
influence advertising and marketing, and organizational capital, as far as human capital
is strongly related to these intangible assets. So, higher skills will result in an improved
performance of these two assets.
As Cañibano et al. (2000) demonstrated, the ownership of a brand that is attractive for
the customers allows the sellers to obtain a higher margin for goods or services, which are
similar to those offered by the competitors. Thus, the development of a brand becomes
a key element in obtaining future benefits. Expenditure on market research and adver-
tising constitutes an important part of the investment in brand equity (Roth and Thum
2013). Presently, the management of the production process involves highly technological
physical capital, which requires highly qualified workers. In such a context, the quality
of the training of the workers becomes relevant. As far as goods become more elaborated
and incorporate more high-intensity technology, production processes are becoming more
complex. Thus, the training of the workers becomes crucial. As Cañibano et al. (2000) and
Abowd et al. (2005) argue, a firm with better qualified workers is expected to obtain higher
profits than other ones with less-skilled employees. In addition, a firm with highly quali-
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fied human resources will have a higher value than other companies with less-qualified
employees (Roth and Thum 2013).
The influence of computerized information on productivity growth is also positive,
although its contribution is less decisive. A plausible explanation may be that once a certain
level of investment in software has been already achieved, additional investment is not
so significant. As Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) state that once the necessary requirements of
software have been achieved, then the difference lies strictly in its strategic use.
According to Bresnahan et al. (2002), organizational change should accompany ICT
adoption in order to boost labor productivity growth. It appears that, although comput-
erized information is the intangible asset showing the highest investment rates between
1995 and 2017, it only has turned out to be a significant contributor together with orga-
nizational capital to labor productivity growth for southern Europe economies and with
R&D investment for northern Europe economies. In line with other authors, such as
Corrado et al. (2013); Chun et al. (2012) or Van Ark and Jäger (2017), ICT shows up also a
positive complementary influence with other intangible assets.
Regarding industrial policy recommendations, as the characteristics of the countries
inside each group are not homogenous enough to define only common measures addressing
the improvement of labor productivity growth, it is difficult to propose homogenous
industrial policy measures for the countries belonging to each group aiming to improve
their performance. For this reason, different policy measures attaining to the differentiated
needs in terms of intangible investment of the considered EU member states should be
implemented.
European countries differ significantly in how heavily they invest in intangible assets
(Roth 2020; Corrado et al. 2013, 2018; Niebel et al. 2017; Peiró-Palomino 2016) and this is
also reflected in their differentiated contribution to labor productivity growth, as our results
show. This hinders drawing a common pattern in their behavior when it comes to defining
a unique policy measure to improve labor productivity growth by means of increasing
intangible investment. It requires a new model of innovation and technological change,
helping countries to make better use of their own innovative capabilities (Timmer et al.
2011). Investment in intangible assets, such as advertising and marketing, vocational
training, and organizational capital, as well as other intangible investments, are closely
related to each country’s needs, that is, they are specific to individual firms. It is the firm
that receives most of the benefits of such changes.
In this context, the main conclusion concerning the implications in terms of industrial
policy is that homogeneous policy measures at EU level should be combined with specific
measures focusing on the member states’ needs when it comes to promoting intangible
investment. In other words, defining the same industrial policy measures for the different
countries might not result in the expected objectives. By nature, capital investment is
highly volatile and very sensitive to changes in the economic conditions of the different
countries. The tides and waves of investment usually follow business cycle expansions and
downturns. This means that policy measures should be designed focusing on the specific
needs of investment in intangibles of the single countries. As Blind and Georghiou (2010)
state, research and innovation policy, as well as other innovation-related policies, should
be coordinated at regional, national, and European levels to maximize the benefits and
minimize the cost. The commitment to innovation and the recognition that a knowledge-
driven approach is fundamental to meet the goals of economic recovery, social development
and sustainability has led to a number of promising initiatives. There is evidence (European
Commission 2020; Dhéret 2014; Pianta 2013) that Europe is not exploiting its innovation
potential and that significant barriers are rooted in a lack of coordination between different
policy initiatives and regulatory frameworks in both vertical and horizontal dimensions.
The vertical issue concerns coordination and effective subsidiarity among the European,
national, and regional levels, while the horizontal is concerned with bringing together the
policies and institutions rooted in sectoral and regulatory domains, but which are critical
for innovation and the effective functioning of markets.
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Our results are in line with those obtained by other authors; that the influence of
intangible investment on the different EU member economies is heterogeneous. For
example, Peiró-Palomino (2016, pp. 190–92) shows that the “different endowments of
intangible assets might explain the differences in regional performance, as well as possibly
affect the regional income convergence process and condition the success of the Cohesion
Policy”. Thus a “more egalitarian regional distribution of these assets would slightly
improve the relative position of the poorest regions, . . . ”. The latter shows the need
for specific policy measures in order to reduce the disparities in terms of these assets, as
investment in intangibles influences the relative position of the economies in terms of
income. It is certain that common measures can be designed for each group of countries,
but to obtain better positive results, they should be complemented with other specific
measures focusing on the concrete problems of each member state.
The technological endowment and capabilities as well as the degree of investment
in intangible assets (Peiró-Palomino 2016) of the EU member states would explain to a
great extent their heterogeneous dynamics of convergence. Different studies show that the
country’s dummy estimates on regional convergence tend to be significant, but they display
very different coefficients, indicating the presence of different steady states linked to the
intrinsic characteristics of each country (Petrakos et al. 2011; Bos et al. 2010). This sustains
that measures promoting investment in intangibles at EU level should be accompanied
by specific measures focusing each country’s needs for the purpose of promoting labor
productivity growth.
According to the European Competitiveness Report (2013), in the EU too little has
been invested in the skill and organizational changes necessary to reap the benefits of ICT
technologies. Lower investments in intangible assets (R&D, human capital, etc.) are likely
to explain slow labor productivity growth, as these factors affect a country’s ability to take
advantage of technology developed elsewhere.
Given that the bulk of technological innovations is concentrated on a few leading
countries, improvements by the lagging countries in the absorptive capacity will be needed
in order to assimilate foreign technologies. The empirical results show that ICT plays a key
role in reducing inefficiencies in the use of resources. In addition, more upstream regula-
tion significantly increases the efficiency gap. In other words, administrative restrictions
imposed on service market competition have widespread negative effects on production
efficiency.
These results provide strong support for the hypothesis that a more competitive
business environment could reduce the efficiency gap, promoting economic competences.
More flexible product market regulations, largely concentrated in key service-providing
industries, are likely to raise efficiency levels across the whole economy. Regulatory changes
in the labor market should also be tailored to restore the necessary balance between regular
and temporary workers.
6. Concluding Remarks
This study has explored the influence of different intangible assets’ investment on
labor productivity growth, using international comparable panel data on the manufacturing
industry for 18 EU member states within a panel analysis between 1995 and 2017.
The main findings can be summarized as follows. The three different categories
of intangible assets make a distinctive contribution to the evolution of productivity. In
particular, intangible assets related to economic competences together with innovative
property assets have been identified as the main drivers for labor productivity growth.
Among the variables considered significant, advertising and marketing, organizational
capital, R&D investment, and design are the ones which contribute individually the most
to productivity growth in European manufacturing, meanwhile computerized information
reveals their complementary effect with other intangible assets.
The splitting of the sample into three different geographical groups confirms a dif-
ferentiated behavior in terms of labor productivity growth and intangible investment
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between and within the blocks. Investment in tangible assets is critical to justify differences
in productivity growth among northern or southern European economies, but not for
central Europe. A complementary effect of the investment in both tangible and intangible
assets is detected only for northern European economies and some economies with a high
rate of investment in intangible assets (such as Luxemburg) do no display a significant
improvement in labor productivity.
The implications of these findings for the design of industrial policy are that common
measures should be combined with specific ones focusing on the particular needs in
terms of intangible investment in each country. A plausible explanation is provided by
the heterogeneity of the characteristics of the different countries included in each group
(Peiró-Palomino 2016). Such diversity within each group needs concrete targeted solutions
to problems shown up by each country to improve their labor productivity growth’s
performance. Thus, it is difficult to label the considered groups according to investment
in intangibles or to a geographic criterion, in order to design a single common industrial
policy for the whole sample.
Our findings provide evidence for updating the present policy frameworks in order
to take into account the relevance of intangible capital, and are in line with those recently
shown in Bauer et al. (2020) and Roth (2020). Evidence suggests that the solution for
the innovation deficit of some European economies consists not only of raising R&D
expenditure across all types of industries of the EU member states (Piekkola 2011). To do
this, policies need to address specific barriers to innovation (European Commission 2020).
Firstly, a general innovation policy is necessary to improve the environment for innovation.
Measures facilitating the interaction among innovators and addressing the lack of young
firms in young R&D-intensive sectors should aim to ease the interaction of the players in
the innovation system and to promote competition. Secondly, it is necessary to introduce
policy measures that tackle the concrete barriers that new firms have to deal with in new
sectors, such as the access to external financing for highly innovative projects.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Variable description, 1995–2017.
Variable Description Acronym
Labor productivity Real value added per hour worked LP
Investment in tangible assets - TC
Investment in intangible assets - IC
Investment in Computer software - SW
Investment in Innovative Property - Scientific R&D R&D
- New architectural and engineering designs, New product
development costs in the financial industry Entertainment,
Artistic and Literary Originals and Mineral Explorations
DESIGN
Investment in Economic Competencies - Market research and Advertising expenditure ADV
- Vocational Training TRAIN
- Organizational capital ORGCAP
Notes: Data source for all variables is EU-KLEMS: https://euklems.eu/; (accessed on 29 March 2021). Except labor productivity, all
monetary variables are expressed in millions of Euros at constant prices (2010 = 100). Total hours worked by persons engaged are expressed
in millions. Labor productivity is expressed in millions of Euros per millions of hours worked. Source: Own elaboration on Corrado et al.
(2014a, 2014b).




LP TC IC SW R&D DESIGN ADV TRAIN ORGCAP
TOTAL 4.00 4.43 3.34 14.57 4.88 4.46 3.38 0.84 2.96
NORTH 4.30 4.83 2.84 10.85 5.73 4.32 2.28 0.37 2.40
Denmark (DK) 2.96 3.48 4.21 11.12 7.45 7.33 1.67 0.04 2.13
Estonia (EE) 6.94 9.64 4.51 34.40 15.02 8.09 3.87 2.03 4.79
Finland (FI) 3.92 −0.79 1.98 5.81 0.89 1.71 1.30 0.24 2.69
Lithuania (LT) 6.70 11.36 4.85 21.78 10.33 4.76 1.95 0.01 3.66
Latvia (LV) 4.40 7.91 −1.11 0.47 13.18 1.24 0.13 1.13 −0.34
Sweden (SE) 4.23 −0.52 5.21 4.15 0.53 5.29 4.11 0.12 8.18
United Kingdom (UK) 2.37 7.59 −1.29 0.13 1.29 2.09 1.69 1.24 −4.95
CENTRAL 4.03 3.81 3.92 19.18 3.79 4.94 5.34 0.87 4.00
Austria (AT) 3.01 3.65 4.41 7.33 5.24 7.90 3.57 0.57 1.76
Czechia (CZ) 5.83 3.77 1.93 3.00 4.55 1.91 −0.33 2.93 3.13
Germany (DE) 2.60 1.57 2.20 5.64 2.18 3.31 0.32 1.03 1.92
France (FR) 3.13 1.23 2.08 2.48 2.09 2.52 1.54 −0.98 3.42
Luxembourg (LU) 1.39 2.45 8.91 72.46 3.98 3.82 27.38 −0.31 11.68
The Netherlands (NL) 2.78 0.91 3.30 6.89 0.45 3.38 2.98 −1.65 2.44
Slovakia (SK) 8.20 12.10 4.06 25.63 4.67 10.17 −0.46 1.99 2.10
SOUTH 3.40 4.59 3.42 15.05 4.93 4.01 2.60 1.69 2.50
Spain (ES) 1.69 3.18 1.19 8.33 5.36 1.87 1.20 −1.26 −0.85
Italy (IT) 1.32 1.74 0.54 1.56 3.88 0.49 −0.08 −0.57 0.94
Romania (RO) 5.63 8.46 10.02 46.07 6.05 8.46 6.68 13.36 7.92
Slovenia (SI) 4.96 5.44 2.73 8.17 4.50 5.22 2.59 −4.77 1.97
Source: See Table A1 for variable definitions. Own elaboration based on EU KLEMS, 2019 release https://euklems.eu/; accessed on 29
March 2021). See Stehrer et al. (2019) for more details.
Notes
1 For a detailed description of the data, see Timmer et al. (2007a, 2007b), and for the previous EU KLEMS database up
to the 2017 release (revised July 2018), see http://www.euklems.net and https://euklems.eu/ for the 2019 release
(both accessed on 29 March 2021).
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